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DENOMINATIONAL AND CULTURAL MODELS AND A POSSIBLE
ECUMENICAL STRATEGY FROM A ROMANIAN CONTEXT

PART II: THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
By Péter Lakatos

A pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Romania, Péter
Lakatos completed the M.Th degree at Princeton Seminary in 1997.
This paper is an abbreviation of his thesis.

The role of the first part [REE XVIII, 5] was to determine the historical
background of Romanian society, as well as to define some root causes of the
problems the society is facing today. We turn now to those problems which are
closely connected to the religious domain and with the social responsibility of the
Church.

Religion and Nationalism
Modern Romania is composed of two culturally different regions: Moldavia
and Wallachia on the one hand (the so called “Old Kingdom”), and Transylvania on
the other. The origin of these two entities is quite different. While Transylvania
revealed an ethnic diversity since the establishment of the Hungarian statehood, the
territories beyond the Carpathians were ethnically more homogenous. The medieval
Transylvanian political system was based on the basic principle of unio trium
natiorum. Though this principle was above the ethnic groups, it was based on a
certain interpretation of the nation. Another distinction is Transylvania's religious
diversity, versus the predominantly Orthodox “Old Kingdom.” The general effect of
these differing traits resulted in different characteristics in the relations between
religion and nationalism of the two regions.

0

Although nationalism and religion were interweaved considerably in the
multi-religious Transylvania, the coexistence of several denominations guaranteed a
certain balance. Although in different historical periods, some denominations were
much closer to the political regime than others. Ethnicity was not identified with a
certain denomination, but with a certain group of denominations.
In Moldavia and Wallachia, Orthodox Christianity as well as language, was
the defining characteristic of ethnicity. Thus the Orthodox Church’s claims that
Orthodox Christianity is the basic element of the “Romanian soul.” The consequence
of this claim is obvious: in Romania, which is defined as a national state by the
constitution, the Orthodox Church is considered to be the “national church.” This
blending of religion with national identity has an extremely detrimental effect. As
Pedro Ramet states, “a religion's claims are absolute, not relative…and no religion
has ever tolerated disloyalty (heresy) or betrayal (reconversion, apostasy).”1 A
differing national identity is also not tolerated, and is considered dangerous for the
existence of the national state. This is why the Orthodox Church maintained a
privileged position under the Communist regime, and why both the Communist
government's internal policy toward nationalities, as well as its external policy, was
supported by the Romanian Orthodox Church. It is no wonder that the Orthodox
Church's main argument against the Greek Catholic Church is a nationalistic one:
namely, the Eastern Rite Catholic Church is “the nation's traitor.” Once a church or
denomination embraces nationalism, there is the danger that a nation and its destiny
will take on an almost religious character. As a result, the concept and understanding
of “nation” becomes rigid and brittle.2 This means that national identity is not viewed
as merely one frame of reference for human existence, but its very essence, condition,
and goal.
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Another aspect of the problem concerns the formation of national states in
Europe. The modern concept of the nation is a relatively new one, and its roots derive
from the ideology of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution. The new
concept of the national state emerged from the Revolution and has determined, to a
great extent, the history of Europe in general, and of Central-Eastern Europe in
particular.

In his study of Central Europe, Charles Ingrao argues that both the

Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires were multinational states, and both of them
guaranteed a certain autonomy to their various ethnic groups. Yet the French model
undermined this system by the “installation of Western-born German princes and
ministers (except in Serbia) and the repatriation of Western-educated Balkan
intellectuals who linked the Balkan's destiny to the uncritical imitation of Western
models.”3 As a final result of this trend, after World War Two several “national”
states were created in Central and Eastern Europe. These states were not “national”
because they were ethnically homogenous, but because their nationalities were
subordinated to the national majority.
These are, in brief, the roots of the problem. What shall the theological
answer be, and what shall be a suitable political solution?

For a theological

interpretation of the concept of the nation, we should first consider the story of Babel.
Genesis 1 offers us the paradigm of ethnicity and nationhood. The story reveals two
facts: first, the ethnic division of humankind does not emerge from the order of
creation. Second, the division along ethnic boundaries is derived from the fallen
condition of humankind. The “confused languages” are consequences of several sins:
haughtiness, vanity, and rebellion. Therefore, confused languages--and I believe that
these two expressions should not be separated--reveal the imprint of man’s rebellion
against God, and its result, depravity.
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The text dealing with the solution for this condition is the story of Pentecost.
In this passage we see how one effect of sin, i.e., ethnic division, is healed by the
Spirit of God. The different languages are no more agents of confusion because they
are set in a much larger context: the Word of God. Pentecost does not mean the
elimination of ethnic differences, but the harmonization of differences by a higher
principle, or, theologically speaking, the sanctification of different languages and
nations. The picture would not be complete without the eschatological dimension of
the problem. The consequences of sin are impossible to eradicate as long as we are in
this present world. Complete healing and restoration remain a future hope: “In that
renewal there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian,
Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all (Col 3:11).”
The ethnic division of humankind, therefore, is neither God's original will, nor
the most important characteristic of our condition. The Church must know that the
highest loyalty is to God, and all the other loyalties must be subordinate. It is not a
denial of national values, but it is a definite relativization of them.4
Nationalism is one of the most acute problems of post-Soviet countries. Is
there any political solution for this? The assertion that democracy is the answer is as
stereotypical as it is meaningless. Democracy is not a definite substance to be
produced in a laboratory. Rather, we can speak about democracy as a general concept
and its particular forms. Claes G. Ryn from the Catholic University of America in
Washington,

D.C.

distinguishes

between

“constitutional

democracy, and the “plebiscitary or majoritarian” one.

or

representative”

These two forms of

democracy represent “wholly different forms of popular rule.” Constitutional or
representative democracy is “popular rule under self-imposed restraints and
representative, decentralized institutions,” and thus is “a society in which the lives of
most citizens are centered in small, local and chiefly private associations. It has many
centers and levels of power. Regional and local entities can exercise independence.”
4
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Plebiscitary or majoritarian democracy “aspires to rule by the popular will of the
moment. It opposes representative, decentralized structures that limit the power of
the numerical majority. Plebiscitary democracy expands and centralizes government
and erodes local and private autonomy.”5
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There are no pure forms of these systems, but in different political structures
the constitutional or plebiscitary elements are predominant. The Romanian political
system is dominated by the plebiscitary elements. It derives from two main factors:
first, the legal system is influenced to a great degree by the French model; and
second, the political power governing after the collapse of communism was not
interested in the reduction of the over-centralized institutions.

Thus, economy,

finances, local administration, education, culture, and the churches are under strong
state control. The new coalition, elected in November 1996, launched the process of
decentralization, but it is still uncertain whether there will be enough political will to
accomplish this process. It is true that this is not a simple task, especially after more
than forty years of Communist rule which paralyzed any voluntary initiative and
atrophied the institutions of civil society. However, not only nationalism but several
other harmful phenomena may be neutralized by the formation of regional, local, and
private autonomy.

Having strong roots in the covenantal perception of

presbyterianism (not limited to its denominational meaning) and puritanism, this
model is appropriate even theologically.

The Churches and Politics
There are two lines dividing the two components of Romania. First, there is
the border between Western and Eastern Christianity, and second, the border between
the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires. Hence, the political comprehension and
traditions of these two regions are, to a great extent, different. The theological
interpretation of the church-state relationship is quite different between Western and
Eastern Christianity.

Western Christianity's political view is a radical and

comprehensive one.

Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches have

comprehensive theological teachings about the mission of the Church and the role of
the state, combined with a strong sense of autonomy. Thus, these churches may
easily conflict with the state, which itself tends to control and to regulate the totality
of society. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Church defines itself as a spiritual factor, and
5

does not have a strong sense of social responsibility. The Western churches want to
assume responsibility for shaping the social, political, and economical process, while
the Orthodox Church considers that what is outside of the “spiritual” realm is the
responsibility of the state.6 In analyzing Western civilization, Samuel Huntington
emphasizes the separation of “God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority
and temporal authority,” as characteristic of the Western thinking. And he concludes:
“In Islam, God is caesar; in China and Japan, caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is
caesar's junior partner.”7
The effects of the different political traditions are also significant.

The

notorious corruption of the Ottoman Empire had a powerful influence on the Balkan
nations. In the territories ruled by the Sultan, the baksis (bribe) was more important
than the law, relations more than aptitude, and temporary interest more than future
consequences.

Indeed, in a state where even the life of the leading elite was

extremely uncertain, cunning, intrigue, and complicity were often the only means of
survival. Although itself considerably corrupt, the Habsburg empire was by all means
different. The Germanic accuracy with regard to rules and law insured a certain
degree of stability even in the darkest periods of oppression.
The relationship of the different Romanian denominations toward political
power is determined by both these factors. The Protestant and the Catholic churches
have been in a mostly politically polemical position. It goes without saying that the
Protestant churches under the Habsburg rule were obviously in opposition with the
anti-Protestant political power, while the opposition position of the Catholic church
was determined by its mostly Hungarian character.

After World War One, the

nationalist character of the Romanian policy yielded a continuous struggle between
the state and the minority churches. This is, to a lesser degree, true for the Greek
Catholic Church.

Under communism, with the exception of the banned Greek

6

Miklós Bárdos-Féltoronyi, “Közép-Európa Egyházai a III évezred küszöbén” (The Churches
of Central Europe at hand of the third millennium,) Mérleg 2 (1992): 32.
7

Samuel P. Huntington, The West:Unique, Not Universal (accessed in 12 February 1997),
available from http://jya.com/clash1.htm; Internet.

6

Catholics, the state controlled every denomination.

However, the degree and

character of this control were determined by the willingness of different churches to
collaborate with the ruling power.
There is no doubt that the most collaborative denomination was the Orthodox
Church. This was confirmed after the political changes, when the former head of the
Department of Cults acknowledged that the Orthodox Church was under the “direct
control and supervision” of the secret police.8 The contradictory relationship of the
Romanian Orthodox Church with the political power persisted after 1989.

The

government used the Church to legitimize its own power, while the Church used its
relations with the government to strengthen its position as the quasi-national church.
Officials of the exclusively Orthodox Church are present any time a state institution
or a military unit is inaugurated, or when the Academy of the intelligence service
holds its annual graduation. The triumphal attitude of the Orthodox Church is often
criticized by the media, as well as by the leading intelligentsia. And its lack of
repentance for its complicity with the Communist regime is evident. In a recent
interview the patriarch was called to account for his cowardly attitude when more
than twenty Orthodox churches were destroyed in the capital under the orders of
Ceausescu. The answer was one of crass cynicism: “If one wants to serve the church,
he needs to be alive. If he withdraws to a monastery, or goes to the grave, if he gives
up the struggle, the whole Church will lose by that.” The comment of the journalist
proved much more understanding of Christian responsibility: “Thus, his holiness
disparages all Christian martyrs who did not have diplomatic sense, so to say, and
died for the faith, making the Church lose out in this way.”9

8
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What should be the role of the churches in such difficult social and political
contexts? The public service of the Church in former East Germany is, I believe,
exemplary and a paradigm to follow. In the GDR, “the Christian Churches, primarily
the Protestant churches, were the primary force and agents behind the wave of
change.”10

Before the peaceful revolution, churches were the hosts of different

opposition groups, and led many demonstrations. After the revolution, however, the
churches refused direct involvement in political life, maintaining their public opinionshaping and prophetic roles. The political responsibility of the Church is not to be
involved in party-politics, but to “fertilize” politics.
Concerning this role of the Church, an excellent study was made by the
Romanian born Virgil Nemoianu, professor at Catholic University of America. His
starting point is that instead of the unjustified “clerical triumphalism” of the
Romanian Orthodox Church, it would be more adequate to take the initiative in
forming a genuine Christian-democratic movement. The important contemporary
Western European Christian-democratic parties, Nemoianu argues, were founded
after World War Two. The need for these parties was determined by the existence of
a considerable mass of traditional--but not authoritarian and extremist--people. By
their political orientation they were not inclined to social-democratic progressivism,
or to individualistic liberalism. The Christian-democratic parties “absorbed, tamed,
and flexibilized” the masses which were otherwise vulnerable to populist extremism.
The ”conservative humanism” of the Christian-democrats, a viable alternative to
more radical, even extremist, ideas (nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism), was of
great importance in the “political maturation” of Western Europe.11
This is just a simple, but meaningful, example of how the churches can
influence politics without exercising pressure on the political power, as it often
10
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happened, not only in Romania, but in several other countries too, or getting directly
involved in party politics. This attitude is, I believe, in accordance with the social and
political responsibility of the Christian Church.

The Churches and Social Reconciliation
Once the oppressive pressure of totalitarian communism was gone, significant
social tensions rose to the surface. Most of these tensions were present during the
communist regime, but were swept under the carpet and no public discussion of them
was allowed. Other tensions, however, appeared or became worse after the collapse
of the system.
The first step to be taken by the church toward a healthier social climate
should be an acknowledgment of its own mistakes and failings. If we really believe
that the attitude of the Church should be the paradigm of the Christian life, then the
new path must begin with repentance. Unfortunately, as we have previously seen, the
full admission did not happen. There were acts of repentance, but they usually lacked
sincere remorse. This is typical in the sense that one single historical analysis of the
Church's communist period came to light, as it happened, in the Reformed Church.
Of course, it is argued that we do not understand the proper historical perspective,
therefore the analysis should be done by future generations. Undoubtedly, we do not
have a perfect perspective. But the acknowledgment must be done nonetheless. This
is a matter of ethics and faith, rather than an academic objective.
In the dynamics of revival, repentance is followed by forgiveness. The hate
and resentment accumulated over long decades of oppression and humiliation is
immense. This force, once out of control, can be really damaging, as it was recently
in Albania. Hate must be channeled in one way or other. Unfortunately, it was often
blamed on different scapegoats: minorities, political parties, social classes, etc. In so
doing, hate was not diminished, but suppressed, and in actuality, increased. In spite
of this, the catharsis of forgiveness was demonstrated by several examples.

9

In former East Germany, members of the secret police were protected from
the revenge of the crowd by none other than the pastors. For example, Honecker was
housed by a church-sponsored social institution. The immense power of forgiveness
is often ignored or refused by the churches themselves. Forgiveness, of course, does
not mean hushing up, but the Church must set an example of respect for the long-term
violation of the rule of law and justice. However, no matter how much it would hurt,
there are injuries impossible to repair. It is particularly valid concerning the injustices
done to the church during the communist era. The churches claim a restitutio in
integrum when they discuss the future of their nationalized properties. However, the
issue is not simple at all. What happens, for instance, in a village with only one
school when the church claims the return of its property, or when a church building
was transformed in a sanatorium or retirement home? Post-communist societies must
learn how to live together with their wounds, and the only way to avoid future
injustice by the taking out of revenge, is forgiveness.
Repentance and forgiveness must be followed by new life. This is not a pious
phrase, but a requirement of our human condition.

In the sphere of social

reconciliation the church must proclaim, first of all, a respect for human dignity and
the importance of solidarity. Human dignity, rooted in our creation in the image of
God, is the primary basis of Christian social ethics. No one has the right to sacrifice
another individual for the so-called sake of society, and vice versa.

Individual

interest is inseparable from community existence. Human dignity is the inalienable
right of every human being, independent of religious conviction, social status,
political orientation, ethnicity, or moral deficiency. There is nothing to differentiate
between “worthy” and “unworthy.” If we recognize this, we may move toward social
solidarity. The context in which everyone must develop his or her own vocation is
human society, with its various structures, institutions, and norms.
It is extremely important that during the communist era, the churches were the
only tolerated elements of civil society. Even in the darkest years of Stalinism, when
every private initiative was brutally suppressed, the churches, somehow, were
functioning. When political elections became a parody of democracy, the board of
10

elders, or the general assembly, was able to make responsible decisions. These facts
invest the church with a special status, and responsibility. A recent survey revealed
that in Romanian society, the confidence in the church (82%) precedes the confidence
in any other institution. In spite of its failures, the church is still appreciated as the
most reliable institution. Besides, owing to its structure (central, regional, local, plus
the educational, social, and other institutions), the church has the potential of reaching
a very large part of society effectively.

If it takes seriously its vocation and

responsibility as the reconciler of society, it could become a powerful agent in
strengthening social consensus.

The Churches and Education
As we saw, the role of the Romanian churches (especially the Protestant and
the Catholic ones) in the field of education was extremely important.

Though

confronted with serious financial difficulties, these churches did not give up this
mission. There are two issues relating to education that we need to address: churchmaintained schools, and religious education in public schools.
The actual laws relating to education did not allow the churches to sponsor
schools except those preparing ministers, or other church professionals. However,
before the law was passed in 1995, a compromise had been reached and several
church-sponsored high schools were permitted to function on a limited basis. On the
occasion of the preparation of the law, a commission formed by representatives of
every denomination was consulted. With the exception of the Romanian Orthodox
Church, every church demanded the right to maintain a full educational system.
The opposition given by the Orthodox Church was determined on two
grounds. On one hand, the Orthodox Church was afraid that schools maintained by
other denominations would endanger its own position. The mission of the Catholic
Church, as well as that of the other denominations, was often attacked by the
Orthodox Church in extremely violent and intolerant ways. The reestablishment and
the active mission of the Greek Catholic Church were considered to be particularly
dangerous for Orthodox interests. On the other hand, since most church schools were
11

sponsored by the churches of the national minorities (especially Hungarians), the
reestablishment of the schools was considered contrary to Romanian national
interests.
There is variation from country to country as to whether the role of the church
in public education is legitimate at all. Historically, church sponsored educational
institutions played a crucial role in the history of the Eastern European nations. Even
after secular education was instituted, church sponsored schools, especially the high
schools, offered the highest quality education. These schools, although maintained by
different churches, were open to every denomination (including the Jews), and the
composition of the student body was multi-denominational. No form of religious or
national discrimination was tolerated, and the religious education of the students was
provided by their own denomination. Because of this the confessional schools were
not denominational ghettoes, but high-quality schools with a strong sense of
ecumenism. Their high professional and moral standards guaranteed the appreciation
and support from society at large. Legally there is no reason why education should be
exclusively secular. As long as private and church educational institutions respect the
curriculum standards and the general program of education, the existence of church
sponsored schools is justified. However, if secular education is based on secular
humanism, there should be an alternative for those who wish to educate their children
in the spirit of the Christian--or any other--religion.
Religious education in the public schools is the second issue.

The law

pertaining to education stipulates that religious education is compulsory in primary
schooling, optional in high school, and “facultative” in the university. This means
that schools are obliged to provide religious education in the primary grades and
parents may choose whether to register their children in these courses. In reality, the
way the law is implemented is as follows: in primary grades religious education is
guaranteed in every school, in the high schools just rarely, and in the university, not at
all.
There is a theoretical issue here. Although in many Western countries any
form of religious education was banned in the public schools, in the former
12

communist countries it was reintroduced in the curriculum on an optional basis.
Public opinion varies on this issue from country to country. In Romania this format
of religious education is generally supported by the populace. The law of education
states that “religious study as a discipline in the primary grades is justified by
the…state to guarantee the human dignity, the…development of the personality with
respect to rights and liberties, the public order and the morals of society; religion, as
well as ethics, [are] the basic elements of the development of the human
personality.”12 This statement introduces the historical aspect of the issue. During the
communist era, the church was removed from its normal place in society and forced
to limit its activity. In so doing the natural development of society, at least in the
sphere of church-society relations, was interrupted. This happened in one of the less
secularized societies of Europe. By reintroducing the option of religious education in
the public schools, public demand was satisfied, and the possibility was created for
the church to once again take its place in society.

Christian Charity
Christian charity is one of the most important public roles of the Church.
Before nationalization, especially the Protestant and the Catholic churches had a good
number of charitable institutions such as hospitals, orphanages, and nursing homes.
Even during the Soviet era the churches carried out basic charity work on the local
level. After the political changes were implemented, institutional activity became
possible and many churches began developing the infrastructure. The established
institutions included orphanages, nursing homes, hospitals, soup kitchens, counseling
services, and others.
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The problems in this field are mostly financial. The nationalized estates are
still the property of the state. Therefore, possibilities are limited. Financial resources
are tight. Consequently, charity work depends mainly on voluntarism and Western
aid. Many have hoped that the state would give financial assistance to charity works,
but this has not been the case. The church provides an important service for the state
by assisting the socially disabled. Moreover, the church's social programs are less
expensive and much more efficient than similar programs run by the state. In spite of
this, churches often run into bureaucratic difficulties and obstacles. Notwithstanding,
this activity must be continued for at least two reasons. First, it is inseparable from
the mission of the Christian Church. Without concrete actions, the proclamation of
the gospel is in the best case not more than well-intentioned moralization. Second, the
way the church fulfills this mission is a model of how society should understand
human dignity and social solidarity.

PART III: AN ECUMENICAL STRATEGY
In the first two parts of this paper I tried to define the social problems which
the Romanian churches must contend with, as well as the roots of those problems. In
this last chapter I wish to propose a strategy for resolving those problems. It is first
necessary to identify the actions to be taken by the Church. Second, since Romanian
society is multi-cultural and multi-religious, I will suggest a strategy for ecumenical
action for the various churches, which would allow cooperation in the field of social
mission.
The problems that Romania is confronted with are enormous. Although the
official Marxist-Leninist doctrine always remained an alien ideology, the prohibition
of any other ideology and the forced secularization of society caused serious moral
damage. Communism denied the value of religion. But the only alternative it could
offer was an obviously stupid, and therefore unacceptable, poor ideological substitute.
It is striking that the resulting moral and intellectual confusion--almost nihilism-influenced a generation whose childhood and youth fell in the 1950's and the early
60's, the era of the intense Stalinist indoctrination.
14

Survival in the communist system was dependent to a great extent upon
hypocrisy and distrust. Fear became one of the fundamental forces to determine how
people acted. Westerners visiting Eastern European countries today often confess
their confusion when faced with people looking grave and tense, rarely smiling. This
is not a mystery; it is the reaction of people who for years had to live in hostile,
unreliable environments.
The double standard imposed by circumstances, as well as the planned
economy (where compensation was not based on productivity) caused the working
morale of people to deteriorate. Many people still do not realize that prosperity, even
in a well-functioning market economy, is impossible to achieve without hard work.
Overcoming this mentality is one of the greatest obstacles to political and economic
transition.
The consequences of both the deficient system and the mentality generated by
it, are perhaps most obvious if we consider the state of health:
Most East European populations are declining or only
just maintaining themselves; infant mortality is
increasing (twice as high as the rest of Europe); and life
expectancy has actually fallen since 1978. The
deterioration in Eastern Europe is unparalleled in the
rest of the developing world.
Demographic expert Jean-Claude Chesnais cites
various factors in the decline. Education, housing, and
health have all suffered because of the disproportionate
amount of national income spent on armaments. Rigid
central planning hinders productivity and leads to
shortages. Food shortages, inadequate heating caused
by fuel shortages, drug shortages, and deteriorating
medical services and hygiene lower life expectancy.
Noxious chemical pollution and industrial accidents (of
which Chernobyl is only a dramatic example) take their
toll, as does widespread chronic alcoholism. The
habitual use of abortion as a means of birth control
leads to lower fertility and higher infant mortality.13

13

Broun and Sikorska, 289-290.

15

The facts are shocking, all the more because we realize that we do not deal
with merely demographic and economic data, or with abstract theories, but with
human lives. It was surprising to many during the second elections after the political
changes in many Eastern European countries, that left-wing parties won the power.
This would be surprising if we did not take into account the human factor. Neither
political programs nor economic strategies can be successful unless they are
supported by society. Yet the people are scared, despairing, and desperate. They are
looking for stability and certainty. Somewhere here lies the role of the Church. The
mission of the Christian Church is enormous, and so is the responsibility. For several
reasons, this is an “acceptable time” time for the Church to address society. The
Gospel can offer the stability and certainty that society is seeking.

Toward a New Strategy
In order to make the preaching of the Gospel more effective, Eastern
European churches need a redefinition of their purpose. The three major aspects of
church activity I want to consider are the theological, the pastoral, and the structural.
Like the Western world, the Eastern European churches were not prepared for
the collapse of communism. It is therefore not surprising that the post-communist
Church was often the “bugle giving indistinctive sound” (1 Cor 14:8.) The
theological dealing with the changes, and with the present situation of the church and
of the society is indispensable. Just as the Western world is tempted to interpret the
collapse of communism as the victory of capitalism, so the church is tempted to
interpret the collapse as the victory of Christianity. Yet, these interpretations are not
true. Communism was not defeated, but collapsed under its own burden. Indeed, a
system rooted in Western Christianity proved to be viable, while the other, atheism
par excellence, failed. But this is another story. The cause of communism's failure
was neither the heroic fight of the West, nor the steadfastness of the Eastern European
churches, though we wish it were. It was simply the economic impotence of the
communist system.

The starting point of theological interpretation must be
16

repentance, not self-sufficient triumphalism.

It must be acknowledged that the

Church survived not because, but in spite of, its attitude.
Another danger is the total rejection of the past. Károly Tóth, long time
bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary, calls our attention to the danger of
unadvised interpretation of the past:
The past summarily disowned and rejected without any analysis and
can unequivocally be regarded as opportunism. It is high time that we
should give a theological answer to our past. But this should be done
as a real task of theology and not simply as an opportunistic antithesis
of all theological reflections that were considered ‘official theology’ in
the forty years of socialism. It would be a great mistake to replace the
quasi-theological thinking of yesterday with another ‘quasi theology’
of today. We should avoid any new manipulation with theological
values.14
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Even if we take into account that Tóth, whose activity as a church leader during
communism was much disputed, is partly defending his own attitude in the past, this
statement should be kept in mind.
Finally, there is the fact that the system change found the Church
theologically

backward.

The

imposed

isolation

from

Western

theological

development, as well as the difficulties raised by the power controlling academic
training, made its influence felt when the Church had to address issues not possible to
address in the past, like politics, economy, abortion, and homosexuality. It is true that
much energy was spent on the reorganization of church life and institutions, and the
process is far from over. But the reconstruction of theology is one of the most urgent
goals.
We need a modernization of the pastoral work, based on a solid theological
reflection. In spite of the severe restrictions placed on it during the communist era, in
a sense, the mission of the Church was simple. The “enemy,” the “evil,” was clearly
identifiable, and thus the methods of resistance more simple. The preservation of the
faith and of the church's legal order was the most important task. In addition, the
churches have not had “competition.” They were the only element of civil society,
and the only (albeit limited) political opposition. However, the situation has radically
changed and we have to realize that “Churches no longer are the island where people
can find freedom. We are only one among many equal groups” as the German
clergyman Werner Kraetschell observed.15 Rather than the well-defined red danger,
we must now face secularism, moral degradation of society, and a strong religious
and secular competition. This can be dealt with by finding new ways to share the
eternal message of the Gospel in our particular social reality. Our conceptions about
pastoral work currently go no further than 1950's and 1960's practical theology. After
the system change, when clinical and prison pastoral work became possible, we
realized that we lacked specialists, and did not have understanding of many other

15
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fields. By postgraduate scholarships offered in Western countries, we started to close
up the ranks, but the shortcomings are still considerable.
The third field of the renewal would be the organization of modern church
structures. Although reorganization of church administration is demanded by certain
groups (though not by the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches), I consider the
reorganization coming from the bottom level more important.

That is because

administrative reform, however proper it might be, will leave mostly unchanged the
largest part of the church. However, the main goal of reform must be to support the
main part of the church, which are the people of the church.
One of the harmful consequences of communist rule is manifested in the lack
of initiative and apathy of the people. This is easy to understand, since strict state
control actually prevented any private or independent initiative. The fact that the
state provided employment, housing, education, and medical care, etc. suggested that
the socialist state takes care of its citizens, and that voluntary organizations are
useless. Of course, this was not a manifestation of “social humanism” but of an allcontrolling dictatorship. This basic feature of the communist structure deconstructed
not just the organizations of the civil society, but also the mental and psychological
patterns they are based on. Thus, many people simply do not acknowledge that, for
instance, the role of political parties is not to provide housing, or solve the problem of
stray dogs. The paternalistic state, in a way, made living more simple and carefree.
In the church the above-mentioned phenomena is accentuated by the
conservative nature of traditionalist institutions. Change, in my opinion, must come
from the level of parish communities. One of the greatest blessings of my time in the
United States was to see how local problems are solved by voluntary associations,
committees, and action groups in society in general, and in the church in particular.
The principle of subsidiarity must become normative for the life of our churches, just
as it is for the socio-political sphere.
Promising steps in this direction were taken, here and there. The reorganized
women's guilds, for instance, treat charity duty in a very efficient way. Properly led
youth groups help in various mission programs.
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There are also church-based

agricultural and educational projects. However, this is just the start. The Church
should emphasize that Christian responsibility implies concrete action in order to
carry out various tasks in the environment we are living in. Nothing can substitute for
the vigor of self-respecting, self-confident, and active base communities.

The Premises of Ecumenical Cooperation
The history of the Romanian ecumenical movement is characterized by
various features, but none of them has much to do with the spirit of oikoumene. The
ecumenical movement was under state direction. This was not because the atheistic
state was concerned about the unity of the Christian body; the reasons were less
pious. First, this was part of the homogenizing process to make the central control
over the society easier. Second, through the ecumenical movement, the nationalistic
communist power used the “national” and loyal Romanian Orthodox Church to attack
the churches of ethnic minorities.

The third reason was a propagandistic one.

Ecumenism was supposed to demonstrate internally, “the indissoluble unity of the
whole people under the leadership of the party,” and outside, the commitment of the
regime to the peace movement. It was not a genuine Romanian idea, since the
Christian Peace Conference, under the patronage of the Moscow Patriarchate, filled a
similar function in the context of “socialist internationalism.”16 Thus, the ecumenical
conferences directed by the Department of Cults and dominated by the Romanian
Orthodox Church were political meetings rather than Christian gatherings.
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After the political changes, the only important ecumenical meeting was held
in 1990.

On this occasion the churches agreed to continue ecumenical dialog.

However, due to increased nationalistic political trends, the prospects for sincere
dialog vanished. The situation was worsened by Romanian Orthodox Church attacks
on the Catholic and neo-Protestant churches especially.

The close ties of the

Orthodox Church with the crypto-communist governing party as well as with the
nationalist and anti-Semite political forces considerably reduced the willingness of
the other denominations to engage in a dialog with the country's main church. Thus,
the ecumenical contacts of the Romanian denominations were determined mostly by
their ethnicity. The leaders of the historical Hungarian churches have a monthly
conference where they act uniformly in supporting minority, as well as religious
human rights. The otherwise rather cool relations of these churches with the Baptist
church have been ameliorated to a degree. But there is still much to do.
There is no doubt that the actual ecumenical situation is intolerable.
Something must be done in order to facilitate true ecumenical dialog. In my view the
task has three main areas that must be focused on: theological, institutional, and local.
One of the good parts of the deceased state-directed ecumenical movement
was the so-called Interconfessional Conferences.

These conferences were held

annually and their task was to promote interconfessional theological dialog. After a
short period of academic dialog, the Orthodox leaders participating in the conferences
became the spokesmen of nationalist policy. I distinctly remember the conference
held in our seminary during my studies. I will never forget how the Protestants in
general, and Hungarians in particular, were humiliated by the peculiarly aggressive
speech of the participating Orthodox metropolitan. None of the Protestant leaders
and professors sitting under the pictures of the outstanding historical personalities of
the Transylvanian Reformed Church, dared to utter a word, because it was clear that
the metropolitan was carrying out “party duties.”
The necessary interconfessional theological dialog should take place among
those who acknowledge the equality of the denominations involved. The theological
issues to be debated and dialogued by the various confessions are numerous. Perhaps
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the most important would be the theological interpretation of nation and nationalism.
An articulate and theologically well-founded response to this important problem
would undoubtedly have a positive effect on future ecumenical efforts. It is also
necessary to analyze the political, social, and economic responsibilities of the
churches, not to mention the concrete issues like abortion, homosexuality, alcoholism,
family, divorce, capital punishment, and ecology.
I do not have any illusion that theological dialog will be easy, or even exempt
from hostility and intolerance. I also acknowledge that on several issues totally
different points of view would make even minimal consensus impossible. However,
what is perhaps more important than a consensus is the opportunity to get acquainted
with each other’s opinions, ideas, and struggles. The numerous common beliefs
could strengthen the recognition that, in spite of significant differences, we are
members of the same Body.
It is startling that denominations coexisting, some of them for centuries, have
so little institutional contact. We have no one who is a specialist in one or other
denomination. A fundamental duty is to train such people. Every main denomination
must have several rapporteurs who know the dogma of the denomination in question
and be familiar with its structure, organizations, and current issues, who read its
periodicals and participate in conferences. Undoubtedly, more direct and personal
contacts could be developed in this way. Student exchanges would be another fruitful
step toward interdenominational communication. It could broaden not just the
theological view, but it could also be an opportunity for interpersonal relations and
further cooperation. Visiting lecturers could move ecumenical relations in the same
direction.
A bold, but extremely beneficial initiative could be the establishment of an
interdenominational charity institution. A nursing home or hospital, maintained by
several denominations, could be the catalyst for practical ecumenical cooperation. I
am not suggesting that these kinds of institutions should replace the denominational
ones, but the existence of one could offer the possibility of practical experience in the
various fields of the ecumenical endeavor.
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The easier objective to realize is the local cooperation of the churches.
Although nationalism is present in many spheres of the life, in daily life people of
different religions and nationalities live and work together.

They participate in

weddings and funerals, as well as many other social events. When the contacts are
human and personal, not official and distant, the differences seem to be less
important. Cooperation between local churches in ecumenical worship and church
programs is not nonexistent, but it is extremely rare. It is also true that once it is
started, prejudices will start to lose their strong normative character, and the social
climate will be considerably warmer.
Whatever good solutions one proposes, they are worth nothing without the
willingness to put them into practice. When the issue is reconciliation, the most
common question is: who will take the first step? We unwillingly acknowledge our
blindness and faintheartedness. Who will take the first step? Nobody has to do that. It
was already done by Somebody else.
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